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Linaw
&
G
overnance
the 21st-century regulatory state
By Assistant Professor Jason M. Solomon

Editor’s note: This
is adapted from a
forthcoming essay in
the Texas Law Review,
and footnotes have
been removed.

In 1996, a Democratic President, Bill
Clinton, famously declared: “The era of
big government is over.”
The question for U.S. policymakers
and legal scholars ever since has been:
what is taking – indeed what should
take – the place of the “command-andFall 2007/Winter 2008

control” post-New Deal regulatory state?
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egal scholarship and pedagogy on predict what the best rules will be down the road, and the mechathe regulatory state are at parallel, nisms for monitoring and adjusting the rules in light of experience
important junctures, and two new are severely lacking.
As Michael Dorf, one of the leading new governance scholars, puts
books stand at the cutting edge.
The first, Law and New Governance it, “in the conditions of modern life, people increasingly find that
in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006), their problem is not so much an inability to persuade those with difedited by Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, fering interests or viewpoints of what to do; their problem is that no
is a collection of works by some of the leading one has a complete solution to what collectively ails them.”
Moreover, scarce state resources mean agencies are unable to sufscholars in the “new governance” field.
The new governance scholars have both described and laid the ficiently help private actors comply, enforce the law, or monitor and
theoretical foundation for what they see as promising and innovative update rules in light of experience.
New governance, then, arises out of this critique of the commandefforts to address public problems.
These efforts attempt to be less hierarchical, more transparent and and-control model.
Under the rubric of “democratic experimentalism,” scholars drawmore democratic than traditional top-down forms of regulation.
The second, The Regulatory and Administrative State: Materials, ing on a pragmatist tradition have presented compelling case studies
Cases, Comments (Oxford University Press, 2006), by Lisa Heinzerling of new modes of regulation that incorporate robust public participation, benchmarking and information-sharand Mark V. Tushnet, is one of the first
ing to solve public problems.
casebooks for a class on the regulatory state
Administrative law scholars are observing
and was no doubt influential in helping
that the traditional model of the administo persuade Harvard’s faculty that adding
Law and New
trative state, where regulatory agencies with
such a class to the first-year curriculum was
expertise issue rules that regulated entities
feasible and desirable as part of their recent
Governance is an
must follow, is giving way to a mode of
curricular reform.
“collaborative governance,” where agencies
Moreover, as the first in Oxford University
important collection of
and industry representatives work together
Press’ 21st Century Legal Education series,
to define and revise standards.
an unusual foray by the elite academic
essays on new
Together, these scholarly strands make
publisher into books for American legal
up the field of “new governance,” a series
education, it will no doubt be influential
approaches to
of efforts to reconceive the relationship
in shaping both what comes next in the
between the state and those it governs.
series and for curricular reform at many law
governance in the
Like many new paradigms, “new goverschools.
nance” defines itself in large part opposiIn this review, I aim to link these two
United States and the
tionally.
books and the developments in the legal
The kinds of regulation encompassed
academy for which they stand: the scholarly
European Union.
in the term “new governance” tend to be
effort to rethink the role of the state in the
less prescriptive, less top-down and more
21st century and the curricular effort to
focused on learning through monitoring
make courses on the regulatory state a core
than compliance with fixed rules.
part of legal education.
As one scholar put it, new governance mechanisms share emphaI think both books are tremendously important and largely succeed on their own terms. But I argue in this review essay that they sis on regulation through “centrally coordinated local problemshare a common flaw: a lack of attention to the “adversarial legalism” solving.”
Both in defining the problem to be addressed and devising soluthat pervades American policymaking and implementation.
tions, new governance forms emphasize provisionality and revisabilLAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE
ity in light of experience.
Under a traditional, command-and-control regulatory model –
The public agency acts to help local actors learn from one another
embodied in the post-New Deal administrative state in the United about best practices and ensures transparency and public participaStates and the harmonization efforts of the European Union – the tion in problem-solving.
state sets rules or standards, through the legislature or agencies delIn such regimes, public and private actors interact in increasegated power by the legislature, and private actors must comply with ingly complex and collaborative ways to address problems of public
those rules. The state enforces those rules through inspection and policy.
other means, sometimes with the help of private attorneys general.
Law and New Governance is an important collection of essays on
But the command-and-control model has come under attack in new approaches to governance in the United States and the European
the last few decades on a number of fronts. Primary among them is Union. Building off a conference at Cambridge University, the essays
the inefficiency and stickiness of the rulemaking process.
in this collection pursue three parallel lines of inquiry.
In a world of uncertainty, legislatures and agencies are unable to
First, the essays provide case studies that describe and evaluate
8
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ongoing experiments in new governance in the United States and
the European Union.
Second, the essays explore the relationship between law and new
governance, with some exploring the “gap” between the two domains,
others positing that new governance is “transformative” of law, and
others pointing to a “hybrid” approach that might prove enduring.
Third, the essays look at the relationship between new governance
and constitutionalism.
In the EU context, the authors are largely asking whether new
governance mechanisms can help provide a raison d’être for the
European Union; while in the United States, the new governance
scholars largely pose the model as a possible answer to the question
of what the role of the state is now that the “era of big government
is over.”
The regulatory experiments examined in the case studies differ in
their origins.
Most of the U.S. examples are what we might call “bootstrapping,”
bottom-up examples of reform, originating either within administrative agencies or from particular institutional actors.
In the EU, however, new governance efforts have been more
deliberate and top-down as the EU Commission has funded and
otherwise promoted research on such efforts.
The principal new governance method in the EU, known as the
Open Method of Coordination (OMC), involves “the setting
of guidelines or objectives at EU level with the elaboration
of Member State action plans or strategy reports in an iterative process intended to bring about greater coordination and
mutual learning in these policy fields.”
Drawing on the international relations literature, some
authors discuss this as a form of “soft law.”
Looking across the case studies, new governance seems less a
structural or institutional description, and more a description of a
particular epistemic approach toward the task of governance.
It draws on John Dewey’s pragmatist notion of learning by
doing, and with its emphasis on benchmarking and rolling best
practices, draws from the “lean production” model of business
organization.

an innovative occupational health and safety program because it did
not comply with formal rulemaking requirements.
For most of the authors, though, law and new governance can
interact in fruitful ways.
De Búrca’s own contribution tells a successful hybrid story of how
judicially enforceable rights of nondiscrimination in the EU are
enforced with rolling best practices about how to promote equality.
Joanne Scott and Jane Holder’s discussion of the water framework
directive in the EU is another example of this sort of hybrid: binding
laws with new governance implementation regimes.
In the United States, Louise Trubek explains how medical malpractice litigation can lead to new governance mechanisms to improve the
quality of care.
For these authors, law and new governance can peaceably coexist.
For Sabel and Simon, transformation of law by new governance is
inevitable and desirable.
They remind readers of the “enduring insight of nineteenthcentury social theory that great innovations only arise in conditions
that undermine their antecedents.”
New forms of governance are emerging because of the limits of
law, and further undermining of law ought to be
embraced.

Are law and new governance compatible?
If “new governance” regimes are not a set of rules passed by democratic institutions that must be followed by others, though, are they
really law?
As Charles Sabel and William Simon, two of the leading new
governance theorists, articulate the concern, doubts emerge as to
whether new governance forms can still be “law in the sense of holding officials accountable for their acts and assuring that citizens are
otherwise secure in the enjoyment of their rights.”
For a few of the authors, there is this gap between law and new
governance that may be insurmountable.
On one version of this thesis, law is simply blind to new governance schemes, as evidenced most distinctly by the failure of the EU
Constitution to mention such forms of regulation.
In another, more dangerous account for new governance proponents, law actively resists or obstructs attempts at new governance.
An example is Orly Lobel’s account of how the courts struck down
Fall 2007/Winter 2008
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For those concerned about accountability, Sabel and Simon point
out the very notion of accountability as a meaningful concept has
been undermined.
Under the traditional, hierarchical notion of principal-agent
accountability, the principal, a democratically elected sovereign
(through the legislature) hands down rules, and the administrative
agent implements those rules and is disciplined if she goes astray by
an independent judiciary tasked with enforcing accountability as a
“matter of pedigree.”
If this account was ever realistic, it is no longer.
The legislature is both not particularly democratically representative and not able to lay down rules with enough specificity so as to
eliminate discretion.
In such a regime, the new governance theorists argue that a more
“dynamic accountability,” where agents are forced to transparently
justify their decisions and are evaluated by peers making similar
decisions, better fulfills the desideratum of a government that is
responsive to its citizens.
Most new governance scholars, then, welcome the challenge that
new governance poses to law.
Many see the concept of law as no longer a useful one in analyzing
the modern regulatory state, and they are not alone.
As another prominent U.S. scholar of regulatory theory recently
put it, perhaps we ought to “bracket” the concept of law altogether,
“suspending its claim to describe some aspect of our society in a useful or convincing way” and deploy the alternative concept of “policy
and implementation” in understanding today’s administrative state.

Is new governance compatible with constitutionalism?
Even if new governance is compatible with law, a further question
arises: can it reach constitutional scale?
In fact, we currently have an ongoing experiment on that very
question: the principal domestic policy innovation of the current
administration, the federal No Child Left Behind education law.
New governance scholars greeted No Child Left Behind, and the
state-level reforms in Texas and Kentucky on which it was based,
with great excitement.

The law acts at the national level much like the EU’s Open
Method of Coordination operates at the supranational level: setting
goals but leaving it to the states to come up with plans for achieving
the goals.
Though it constituted an unprecedented federal level of involvement in state and local education policy, states and local school districts were granted autonomy to devise their own plans for achieving
progress, and even for defining the standards themselves.
In return, the federal government required accountability measures including data to ensure students, disaggregated by race and
income, were making “adequate yearly progress.”
Public participation was guaranteed by provisions requiring the
federal Department of Education to include parent representatives
on a committee that would review the implementing regulations
and other provisions, giving parents the right to get information
from their school districts about the qualifications of their children’s
teachers.
If No Child is successful, it will be strong evidence that large-scale
new governance regulation can work in the United States and may
have broad political support as the basis for any “new constitutional
order” in the United States.
The jury is still out on the success of No Child.
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, signed into law by President George W. Bush,
is a working example of new governance in the United States. The act was created to
strengthen performance-based accountability for all public schools and students.

On the positive side – indeed, this may make anything else mere
quibbles – there is substantial evidence that the math and reading
scores of disadvantaged students have gone up since the passage of
the law, though the causal connection is not established.
On the other side of the ledger, teachers report increased time
“teaching to the test” that may crowd out other important educational goals.
Scholars and policymakers have raised the question of whether the
benefits of the law outweigh the unintended consequences of No
Child, including encouraging states to lower academic standards,
pushing poor and minority students out of schools, and creating an
environment that discourages strong teachers from taking jobs in
schools with high numbers of disadvantaged students.
Is this a successful regulatory model both for educational policy
and other domains? Again, the jury is still out.
For new governance scholars, the model’s strength is its ability to
learn from experience and to update both the goals of the regulatory
scheme and the means in light of experience.
In the No Child context, states can both learn from their own
experience and the experience of other states through the benchmarking coordinated at the federal level.
But when one talks about experimenting at a local level in light
of uncertainty about how best to proceed, one thinks of the familiar
federalism idea of states as “laboratories of democracy.”
Even if it is different than federalism, is the new-governance, No
Child model really better?
One leading scholar of education policy, Harvard’s Richard
Elmore, thinks not. He points out that before No Child states were
experimenting with various kinds of performance-based accountability, and No Child “narrows the domain of experimentation drastically and hence limits the amount we can know.”
He believes annual testing is one way to measure performance, but
it is not the only way and may not be the best way. Under No Child,
it is the mandatory way.
From a different direction, scholars have criticized No Child for its
mix of federal involvement but leaving flexibility to the states – precisely the recipe prescribed by new governance advocates.
As James Ryan puts it, perhaps the federal government “should
get off the federalism fence.” Either the political and institutional
dynamics are such that the states can be trusted to establish and
enforce strong academic standards, or they can not. And if they
cannot, then perhaps the federal government ought to just prescribe
national standards, as a precursor to No Child passed under President
Clinton did, and as was supported by the first President Bush.
To be sure, perhaps political reality would stand in the way of such
standards – but that is not the new governance proponents’ argument. Their argument is that providing states flexibility is better as a
policy matter because of the uncertainty about ends and means.

THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Public law in legal education
As scholars rethink the role of today’s regulatory state, educators
are exploring its proper role in legal education.
Since the rise of the administrative state in the United States with
the New Deal, legal education has struggled to incorporate “public
Fall 2007/Winter 2008

law” courses into their curricula.
The first courses to appear during the 1930s and 1940s were
administrative law courses, dealing with the process by which agencies do rulemaking, judicial review and other related topics.
At roughly the same time, legislation courses grew, introducing
students to the legislative process, and how to read and interpret
statutes.
After World War II, two professors at Harvard, Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks, developed what grew to be legendary materials called
“The Legal Process.” These materials introduced students to the
different ways society can deal with problems, including regulation
through administrative agencies.
The administrative law and legislation courses have remained
staples of the upper-level curriculum, and though the legal process
was taught in dozens of law schools in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s,
it is now only taught in a handful.
In the meantime, beginning in the late 1980s, many law schools
moved toward requiring some kind of “public law” course as part of
the first-year curriculum.
Though some schools did this through an administrative law or
legislation course, others such as Columbia, NYU and Georgetown
developed a “regulatory state” course that focused in large part on
questions of institutional or regulatory design.
With Harvard’s recent adoption of such a course into the required
first-year curriculum, and a prominent scholar of regulation and
Vanderbilt’s dean, Edward Rubin, leading curricular-reform efforts
both at his own school and through the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS), the issue has come to the fore again.

Heinzerling and Tushnet’s approach The book’s strategy
Into the mix steps Harvard’s Tushnet and Georgetown’s Heinzerling
with their new book, The Regulatory and Administrative State. This
is a new casebook designed to fill the void in the market – where
demand may also grow if other schools follow Harvard’s lead and
require such a course – for materials to teach an introductory course
in public law.
On the question of whether such a course should be required,
Tushnet and Heinzerling are clear in the preface: “Lawyers in the
21st-century need course materials of this sort. They are deeply
involved in public law and the regulatory state, and need the skills
– including the ability to read and understand statutes – associated
with the modern regulatory state.”
At this stage, the question of whether law students need the “skills
... associated with the modern regulatory state” is not controversial.
The issue is whether or not this book provides them.
This book takes as its theme the regulation of risks to human life
and health.
In exploring how the law regulates these areas, the book considers
recurring issues of institutional choice, statutory interpretation, and
market and regulatory failure. And, it is quite different from a standard administrative law or legislation book.
The book proceeds in four parts: First, it considers the basic justifications for regulation in circumstances where the individual parties
contract.
Advocate
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At this stage, the question
of whether law students
need the “skills ... associated
with the modern regulatory
state” is not controversial.
The issue is whether or not [The

Regulatory and Administrative
State] provides them.
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Second, it explores the contours of common-law regulation of risks
to human life and health through both criminal and tort law.
Third, the book takes up the emergence of the modern regulatory
state as a response to the perceived failure in common-law regulation
of risk. In doing so, it offers an introduction to statutory interpretation, administrative law and public choice theory.
Finally, the book closes with a section on “new perspectives” on
the regulatory and administrative state in the 21st century, exploring
some of the same issues explored in greater depth in Law and New
Governance.
In guiding students’ reflections on these matters, the authors put
the students, implicitly, in the role of policymakers, asking questions
like “what is the best institution to use in responding to” work-related
carpal tunnel syndrome, climate change and other issues.
As I explain further below, this perspective of the policymaker,
or what the authors refer to in the book as the “disinterested social
scientist,” is the primary perspective with which the authors approach
these materials.
More promising, in my view, are the too-rare instances where students are asked to think about the role of lawyers.
In one chapter, for example, students are asked to think about how
lawyers affect the process by which individuals complain about workplace sexual harassment or secondhand smoke – even here, though,
the students are asked to play social scientists thinking about the role
of lawyers, not thinking as lawyers themselves.
Part III, “The Modern Regulatory State,” is the core of the book,
introducing students to statutory interpretation, the basics of administrative law and some modern features of contemporary regulation
including cost-benefit analysis and information provision.
The authors provide a solid introduction to the key administrative law topics of rulemaking, judicial review, standard-setting and
nondelegation, primarily through the principal U.S. Supreme Court
cases and a few circuit opinions applying those cases.
To be sure, future lawyers in a regulatory practice would have to
take the full administrative law course, but others could be confident
that they have a decent foundation.
The authors also present interesting materials on regulatory design:
cost-benefit analysis, some of the ways regulatory efforts fail and how
providing information can be a market-based solution to regulating
risk (but one that also has its limits, as psychological research presented indicates).
The materials on statutory interpretation, though, are inadequate,
covering only one chapter and arguably not even that. This is a serious flaw.
The materials on statutory interpretation consist of excerpts from
a few classic articles – by Karl Llewellyn, Frank Easterbrook and
Stephen Breyer – to provide an excellent introduction to the overall
approach in interpreting statutes.
These articles are followed by two cases – one, the classic “Holy
Trinity” case, which demonstrates the conflict between statutory
purpose and the text, and then a Seventh Circuit opinion interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, which features interesting, dueling
opinions from Judges Posner and Easterbrook.
After that, the authors go right to Chevron, the classic U.S. Supreme
Court case about judicial deference to agency interpretation of statFall 2007/Winter 2008

utes, and a more recent case on that
by a statutory provision or is covtopic, Brown and Williamson. The
ered – and future lawyers need to
What will the American
canons of statutory interpretation
be trained in how to make these
barely appear.
kinds of arguments the same way
regulatory state look like in
At the close of Part III, the
they are trained to make doctrinal
authors take a welcome turn from
arguments.
20 years? To a certain extent,
the perspective of a “disinterested
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM
social scientist” to the perspective
both books are making
AND LAWYERS
of politicians.
What will the American regulaIn this chapter, they introduce
wagers on that answer.
tory state look like in 20 years? To a
“public choice theory,” the microcertain extent, both books are makeconomic approach that looks at
I argue that how each book
ing wagers on that answer.
the self-interested incentives that
I argue that how each book deals
politicians have in making reguladeals with that question has an
with that question has an impact
tory choices. They want to run
on the other and could help shape
for reelection, they need to raise
impact on the other and could
the very answer itself.
money for such a campaign and
The argument goes like this: a
their choices are shaped by these
help shape the very answer itself.
key and largely unexplored variable
realities.
in the scalability of new goverBesides the excerpts from public
nance in the United States is our
choice theory, the authors include
culture of “adversarial legalism,” to
an interesting essay from Harvard
use Robert Kagan’s term. In not
political theorist Jane Mansbridge
grappling with that issue, the new
questioning the premises of public
choice theory with its focus on self-interestedness, its acceptance of governance literature currently falls short.
The question is: why do new governance scholars think interests
“adversary democracy” and the absence of deliberation from this view
accustomed to battling over policy will put down their swords, share
of public life.
information and collaborate?
No doubt the new governance scholars would agree.
Perhaps the reason why new governance is much more widespread
But all must face the question of how exactly to get past the reality
of “adversary democracy” and toward the aspiration of greater delib- in the European Union, and may remain that way, is because of this
lack of adversarial legal culture. But this variable is largely unexplored
eration in public life, a theme I will return to later.
This book is ambitious. On the theory that students will learn in the new governance literature thus far.
Indeed, the adversarial legal culture may carry over to new govermore by “seeing the subjects in a unified course,” Heinzerling and
Tushnet designed the book as an introduction to “the reasons for reg- nance schemes.
To take one example, Kagan cites the Educational for All
ulation, the ways in which regulation can go awry, the choice of legal
institutions for regulation, the choice of regulatory instruments, and Handicapped Children Act as an example of a law that relies on due
the theory and practice of statutory interpretation.” But in attempt- process rights and private lawsuits for enforcement, as opposed to an
administrative enforcement mechanism that would not rely on the
ing to do so much, the authors risk accomplishing relatively little.
The authors believe that today’s lawyers need to know “both an courts.
Anecdotal evidence suggests the same lawyers who challenged the
understanding of statutory interpretation and an understanding of
schools under that law have also started bringing legal challenges
the reasons for regulation.”
under No Child Left Behind.
However, it is not clear why exactly they need the latter.
Moreover, parents and their lawyers are starting to use the No
To be sure, when Willard Hurst first designed such a course at
Wisconsin during the 1940s, the place of the administrative state Child Left Behind right to transfer a student out of a low-performing
itself was much more tenuous. In that context, a course that spent school to challenge school rezoning decisions.
This is not to say these developments are necessarily bad, just
some time demonstrating the limits of the common law or the need
for scientific expertise as part of the executive branch might have that the shift from a rights-based, court-centric model to a problemsolving, collaborative one seems tentative at best.
made sense.
In order for new governance to succeed, perhaps it will be necesBut today, the administrative state is an inescapable part of our
legal system. No one is suggesting it is unnecessary in our complex sary to amend the Administrative Procedure Act to limit judicial
review considerably.
modern society.
Will lawyers accept this? Regulated entities? Will citizens? Should
What is needed is more of an approach that focuses on training
they?
future lawyers to make arguments about how to interpret statutes.
Alternatively, maybe it does not matter to the success of the new
Put simply, depending on the client and the situation, a lawyer
will have to argue either that a client or his conduct is not covered governance project if affected parties still have the opportunity to
Fall 2007/Winter 2008
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challenge regulations once formulated. But this would seem an odd
conclusion since continued opportunity for challenge would reduce
the incentive to actually participate and collaborate in the policymaking process.
If the claim, then, is that the collaborative process itself will lead to
less adversarial positioning for strategic advantage, then that requires
some empirical support, particularly in light of the evidence to the
contrary with respect to negotiated rulemaking.
The scholars in Law and New Governance largely position themselves as social engineers, technocrats deciding the optimal government programs.
But if the new governance scholars are going to succeed in understanding the circumstances in which such schemes will work, they
must take greater account of how the schemes arise and are implemented.
For better or worse, lawyers are generally not trying to work with
others to reach the “best” social outcome – whether it be lower drug
use, higher school test scores or safer workplaces. Rather, they are trying to advance their client’s interests in the particular context.
But our adversarial legal culture is not fixed, either, and one
explanatory factor here may be how we train tomorrow’s lawyers.
Here, Heinzerling and Tushnet miss an opportunity.
To be sure, they do not ask students to play the role of warrior litigators, but nor do they ask them to play the role of problem-solving
collaborators either. In doing so, they fail to maximize the chances
that tomorrow’s lawyers will act to change the adversarial legal culture
in which they will operate.
Like the new governance scholars, The Regulatory and Administrative
State generally takes a neutral, technocratic perspective, that of a
“disinterested social scientist, attempting to determine what choices
among institutions would best serve the public interest.”
Focusing on the general topic of risk regulation, the book asks the
questions: when is government regulation necessary and desirable,
and what form can and should regulation take? These are important
and interesting topics, but a lack of attention to adversarial legalism
means this book falls short.
Tushnet and Heinzerling’s failure to attend closer to the role of
lawyers and adversarial legalism is not just a pedagogical failure, then,
it is a scholarly one as well.
If the relative success of the regulatory instruments depends in
part on the role lawyers play, and the degree to which adversarial
legalism can gum up the works, so to speak, then comparative institutional analysis that fails to look at these issues is incomplete and
inaccurate.
The example of No Child Left Behind helps illustrate this common weakness.
With its accountability measures, the law was a promising example
for the new governance scholars of the promise of democratic experimentalism (if properly implemented).
But only by examining how such a law has and could play out “on
the ground” can one begin to understand the circumstances under
which such a model of regulation can work and, where it fails, how
it can be improved. And the way it will be implemented is not by
everyone holding hands and working together for the public interest.
It is through a complex pushing and pulling, with lawyers for teach14
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ers’ unions, school districts and government agencies battling over
what constitutes compliance with the law.
Only by examining this “new governance” innovation in the context of our adversarial legal system can it be properly evaluated.

CONCLUSION
Put differently, the fate of the project at the heart of each book is
inextricably linked to the other.
For the new governance scholars, the success of new governance
as an overarching regulatory theory depends, at least in the United
States, on the next generation of lawyers having the skills and inclination to overcome the culture of “adversarial legalism” that pervades
policy implementation today. That is, in determining the success of
new governance as a model for the 21st-century regulatory state,
the training and receptivity of lawyers may well be an explanatory
variable.
By the same token, for public-law curricular reformers like Tushnet
and Heinzerling, their book only succeeds if it provides adequate
tools to the next generation of lawyers to be effective in the 21stcentury regulatory state.
To be sure, there is an empirical and unanswerable question here:
What will the U.S. regulatory state look like in 20 years? But, I
fear that the new governance scholars may be more right about the
future than Tushnet thinks, and that the materials and skills in The
Regulatory and Administrative State are therefore inadequate preparation for the post-regulatory state.
The students who are trained by The Regulatory and Administrative
State will understand what it means to challenge agency-issued regulations in the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
but not how to work with a school district to develop a plan to meet
the goals of the No Child Left Behind law or a hospital developing
a system to protect information privacy under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). And yet, the latter tasks
are likely to be more common than APA challenges for lawyers in
2020, perhaps even today.
At the same time, the new governance scholars could benefit from
the kind of comparative institutional analysis that Heinzerling and
Tushnet teach their students.
For example, is the No Child Left Behind method of allowing
states the flexibility to define standards for students really likely to
lead to higher student achievement than if the federal government
set the standards themselves? If so, why?
This kind of comparative analysis is frequently absent from the
inevitability narrative advanced by some of the new governance
scholars.
As we move more or less toward a new constitutional order in the
United States, we must understand the kinds of regulatory mechanisms that are likely to be effective and train tomorrow’s lawyers to
effectively represent their clients within such a regulatory framework.
Together, these two books are a promising start.
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